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 Conflicts of Criminal Jurisdiction 
in the European Union
FRANK ZIMMERMANN*1
1 Introduction
The European Union shall be (or become) an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ 
-this is what Article 67(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) solemnly proclaims. It is the aim of this contribution to show that if this is to 
be taken seriously, conflicts of criminal jurisdiction between the Member States of the 
Union should no longer be ignored. Rather, the prevention of such conflicts is of par-
amount importance for the development of a coherent criminal justice system in the 
European Union (infra 2). Therefore, an attempt will be made to offer guidelines for a 
European solution to this problem in the second part of this contribution (infra 3). 
As an initial step, however, the topic of this contribution must be defined in somewhat 
more detail: First, this study will focus on conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States 
of the Union (‘horizontal’ conflicts). Overlaps of supranational and national prosecution 
competences (‘vertical’ conflicts) will not be addressed—although some of the proposals 
made here can certainly be transferred to vertical conflicts, depending on the precise 
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delimitation of each level’s competences.1 Second, only multiple prosecution interests re-
garding natural persons shall be analysed. Possible solutions to more complex situations 
where multi-national legal entities are involved must therefore be discussed elsewhere.2 
Finally, this article will be restricted to so-called ‘positive’ conflicts of jurisdiction, i.e. 
cases where different Member States actually want to or at least could exercise their crim-
inal jurisdiction. ‘Negative’ conflicts of jurisdiction, by contrast, can arise when no state 
is willing or able to prosecute. They will therefore often lead to impunity. Certainly, such 
negative conflicts are of relevance in EU law, particularly because there is a need to effec-
tively combat fraud against the Union’s financial interests (see Article 325 TFEU). Never-
theless, they shall not be analysed in further detail here as the competence of the Union 
to legislate in this field (and thus oblige Member States to prosecute) has already been 
thoroughly discussed.3
2  Why Are Conflicts of Criminal Jurisdiction Problematic?
Before it is possible to offer a convincing solution to conflicts of criminal jurisdiction, 
it is first necessary to ascertain the need to do so: such conflicts are not really a new phe-
nomenon. Rather, it can be assumed that there always have been cases regarding which 
several states were able to apply their criminal laws, and traditionally this has not raised 
great concern.4 The following part is therefore dedicated to the question of what in the 
situation of the Union is so specific that a different view ought to be taken. As a first step, 
the interests which are affected by conflicts of criminal jurisdiction will be analysed. It 
is submitted that such conflicts jeopardise essential interests of both the individual who 
faces prosecution and the Member States involved.
1 Zimmermann, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law under the Future Regulation on the 
Establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in The European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office. Legal and Criminal Policy Perspectives, ed. Asp (Skrifter utgivna av Juridiska fakulteten 
vid Stockholms universitet 2015), pp.156-177; Wasmeier, The Choice of Forum by the European 
Public Prosecutor in The European Public Prosecutor’s Office. An Extended Arm or a Two-Headed 
Dragon?, ed. Erkelens, Meij & Pawlik (Springer 2014), pp. 139-160. For a more in depth analysis 
see Neumann, Vertikale Kompetenzverteilung im Strafrechtssystem der EU (Nomos 2015); 
Reinbacher, Strafrecht im Mehrebenensystem (Nomos 2015).
2 Schneider, Corporate Criminal Liability and Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Regulating Corporate 
Criminal Liability, ed. Brodowski et al. (Springer 2014), pp. 249-260.
3 Satzger, International and European Criminal Law (C.H. Beck 2012), § 6 margin nos. 20-30; Asp, 
Criminal Law Competence of the EU (Skrifter utgivna av Juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms 
universitet 2012), pp. 142-157; Zimmermann, The Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon on 
Criminal Law, in The EU and National Constitutional Law, ed. Huber (Boorberg 2012), pp. 73-
74. 
4 There were, however, several early initiatives aiming at the prevention of conflicts of jurisdiction, 
see for instance a draft Council of Europe Convention, Recommendation 420 (1965), Assembly 
debate on 29th January 1965 (24th Sitting); see also Ambos, Vor §§ 3-7 in Münchner Kommentar 
zum Strafgesetzbuch, 2nd edition, ed. Joecks and Miebach (C.H. Beck 2011), margin nos. 56 ff.
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2.1 Interests affected by ‘concrete’ conflicts of criminal jurisdiction
To illustrate this contention, the following case may serve as an example of a ‘concrete’ 
conflict of jurisdiction, i.e. a situation where several Member States actually can (and 
want to) prosecute one and the same act.5 
Case 1: 
At a conference in Munich (Germany), a Finnish national A mixes poison into the beer of 
her Danish colleague T in order to kill him. However, the poison does not show its effects 
immediately. Therefore, T boards a flight back to Denmark. During a stopover at Arlanda 
airport (Sweden), T suddenly feels sick, collapses and dies from the poison.
In such a homicide case, it can reasonably be assumed that the act constitutes a criminal 
offence in all jurisdictions involved, i.e. in Germany, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Ac-
cording to well-established principles of criminal jurisdiction,6 each of these four Mem-
ber States could7 prosecute A: Germany and Sweden based on the principle of territoriali-
ty because the relevant act was committed on German soil8 and caused effects in Sweden.9 
Finland could claim jurisdiction over the case because A is a Finnish national (principle 
of active personality),10 and the same is true for Denmark because T is a Danish national 
(protective principle or principle of passive personality).11 Of course there are several 
more principles which allow states to extend their criminal jurisdiction beyond their 
own borders (most importantly the principle of state protection). If one moreover takes 
into account the fact that various shades of these principles exist,12 it appears reasonable 
to state that overlaps of different (Member) States’ criminal jurisdiction are not at all an 
exotic exception. Taken together with the increased mobility of citizens (greatly promot-
ed by Union law) as well as technical progress which makes it possible to communicate, 
5 The notion is taken from Vander Beken et al., Finding the best place for prosecution: European 
study on jurisdiction criteria (Maklu 2002), p. 18.
6 For an overview see Satzger 2012, § 4.
7 Of course that does not mean that all states make use of this possibility. For instance, the principle 
of passive personality is not at all recognised in all jurisdictions, also because it is strongly 
debated to which extent it is in conformity with international law. See for instance Elholm & 
Feldtmann, Nordic trends of jurisdiction, in Criminal Jurisdiction. A Nordic Perspective, eds. 
Elholm & Feldtmann (Djøf 2014), pp. 152 ff.
8 Section 9(1) of the German Penal Code.
9 For details see Cornils, Sweden, in Elholm & Feldtmann 2014, p. 134.
10 For details see Suominen, Finland in Elholm & Feldtmann 2014, pp. 49 ff.
11 For details see Cornils & Vagn Greve, Denmark in Elholm & Feldtmann 2014, pp. 26 ff.
12 For the territoriality principle see the comparative analysis by Sinn, Das Strafanwendungsrecht 
als Schlüssel zur Lösung von Jurisdiktionskonflikten? Rechtsvergleichende Beobachtungen in 
Conflicts of jurisdiction in cross-border crime situations, ed. Sinn (Universitätsverlag Osnabrück 
2012), pp. 515-518.
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trade across borders and so forth, this situation creates a considerable potential for con-
flicts of criminal jurisdiction between Member States of the Union. 
Thus, two questions arise. The first one is: should each of the Member States involved be 
allowed to initiate investigations and prosecute the perpetrator? A negative answer leads 
to the second question: in which Member State should proceedings take place? 
2.1.1 Interests of the individual concerned
From the individual’s perspective, conflicts of criminal jurisdiction entail a risk of 
multiple prosecution and punishment in different Member States: in our first case A 
would in principle—special rules applicable within the EU will be dealt with infra 2.4—
have to face criminal proceedings in all four jurisdictions. This implies that investigative 
measures may be ordered simultaneously, which would make it very complicated and 
expensive to organise an effective defence.13 Furthermore, some measures may have to 
be repeated in each Member State. Compared to criminal proceedings in just one state, 
the intensity of the interference with the suspect’s fundamental rights would thus be in-
creased.14 Finally, if A were to be convicted in all four Member States, the accumulated 
sanctions could go far beyond what is proportionate: hypothetically she could be pun-
ished four times, as if she had killed four persons instead of one. Even if the Member 
States concerned reduced their respective sanctions to the extent that a prior sentence has 
already been enforced abroad for the same crime,15 the most severe punishment regime 
would ultimately apply. Such an automatic predominance of the most punitive criminal 
justice system is hardly convincing in an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.16 
Even when there is no risk of repeated proceedings -for instance because the Member 
States involved decide not to exercise their ius puniendi if the act has already been pun-
ished abroad- the situation for the suspect remains problematic. Then the crucial ques-
13 Nestler, European defence in trans-national criminal proceedings in A Programme for European 
Criminal Justice, ed. Schünemann (Carl Heymanns 2006), p. 418; Szwarc, Eurodefence – Support 
for the Defence in A Programme for European Criminal Justice, ed. Schünemann (Carl Heymanns 
2006), pp. 429 ff.; Zimmermann 2014, p. 178; in the context of mutual recognition Satzger 2012, 
§ 8 margin no. 22.
14 Lagodny, Empfiehlt es sich eine europäische Gerichtskompetenz für Strafgewaltskonflikte 
vorzusehen? (2001, full text available at http://www.uni-salzburg.at/strafrecht/lagodny), 
pp. 36 ff.; Eser & Burchard, Interlokales ‘ne bis in idem’ in Europa? Von ‘westphälischem’ 
Souveränitätspathos zu europäischem Gemeinschaftsdenken in Freiheit, Sicherheit und Recht: 
Festschrift für Jürgen Meyer zum 70. Geburtstag (Nomos 2006), p. 504; Zimmermann 2014, pp. 
177 ff.
15 See, for instance, section 51(3) German Penal Code.
16 See in the context of mutual recognition Schünemann, Europäischer Haftbefehl und EU-
Verfassungsentwurf auf schiefer Ebene – Die Schranken des Grundgesetzes, in ZRP (2003), 
p. 187.
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tion is where the first trial will take place, or in other words which Member State is to be 
the forum state. This is of great importance as the law that is applied at trial depends on 
the forum state. This is one of the major differences when compared to the situation in a 
purely domestic case, where different courts may be competent, yet the same law always 
applies.17 On the one hand, the applicable law defines the procedural rules, such as those 
on the legal preconditions of investigative measures, the admissibility of certain pieces 
of evidence, the position of the accused in trial and their right to appeal. Thus, where 
the trial takes place can be crucial for the likelihood of a conviction. On the other, it also 
determines the provisions of substantive law that are applicable.18 As long as the act is 
criminalised in all Member States, this matter may at first sight appear negligible. How-
ever, the applicable law still determines the sanction in the particular case. Considering 
the fact that the level of sanctions for one and the same offence can differ greatly within 
the EU, it will often be impossible for the accused to foresee the severity of the sanction 
that could be imposed. In this regard, our first case is certainly not the most impressive 
example because A must expect a long prison sentence in all the jurisdictions involved. 
But for many other offences the picture is quite different, particularly because Member 
States’ criminal law provisions often differ with regard to aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances.19 Moreover, there may be a possibility to dispense with prosecution in some 
Member States, but not in all. This can lead to a situation where an act can entail a severe 
prison sentence in one Member State whereas it goes (almost) unpunished in another. 
As a result, the citizen will often have no idea of the penalty that is to be expected in the 
actual case and thus of how strongly national law disapproves his conduct. Such a lack of 
foreseeability can amount to a violation of the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine 
lege certa), which guarantees the foreseeability not only of criminal punishment as such, 
but also of the possible level of the sanction.20
This leads to the conclusion that where the case is to be tried is decisive for the outcome 
of the proceeding. In an ‘area of justice’ this should therefore not be determined by coin-
cidence, but on the basis of objective and ‘just’ criteria. Furthermore, there is an obvious 
danger that prosecution authorities might be tempted to allocate the case to a Member 
State where the legal situation is most favourable for a conviction. In other words, there is 
17 SEC (2005) 1767, p. 31; Eisele, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in der Europäischen Union: Vom 
nationalen Strafanwendungsrecht zum Europäischen Kollisionsrecht, in 125 Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (2013), p. 27.
18 Lagodny 2001, p. 114.
19 For instance, a theft committed in a train can entail a prison sentence of up to six months in 
Austria (section 127 Austrian Penal Code), up to five years in Germany (section 242(1) German 
Penal Code), or between three and ten years in Italy (Article 625(1) Italian Penal Code); see also 
Zimmermann 2014, p. 175 ff. 
20 Camilleri v. Malta, ECtHR Judgement of 22.01.2013, appl. no. 42931/10, paras. 40 ff.; Roxin, 
Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil Band I, (4th ed., C.H. Beck 2006), § 5 margin nos. 80 ff.
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a risk of forum shopping to the detriment21 of the accused. An already undesirable situa-
tion where the location for the trial is determined by coincidence, would be even worse if 
prosecution authorities had the option of freely choosing a jurisdiction.22 This should, of 
course, not be misunderstood as an expression of general mistrust towards prosecutors. 
But under the rule of law, even a small risk of manipulation in criminal proceedings must 
be avoided.23 Such important decisions as which jurisdiction a suspect will be tried in, 
should therefore be made by the legislator—at least to the greatest possible extent. 
Thus, the interests of the individual can be summarised as follows: (1) repeated and par-
allel proceedings for the same act have to be avoided, (2) the case should not be allocated 
in a way that one-sidedly disadvantages the suspect and (3) it must be ensured that the 
risk of punishment as such and the applicable sanctions are foreseeable. 
2.1.2 Interests of the Member States involved
The interests of the Member States involved, by contrast, can mainly24 be derived from 
the purpose behind criminal punishment. Each of the Member States in our case will aim 
at the prevention of, deterrence from and retaliation for an act that is a serious criminal 
offence in its jurisdiction. However, it could be argued that within an ‘area of freedom, 
security and justice’ it should not make a difference in which Member State the trial takes 
place and where the sanction is imposed.25 Indeed, this reasoning would reflect very well 
21 Some have argued that there is also a risk of forum shopping by the suspect, who could surrender 
to the police in the Member State where the legal situation is most favourable for him, see Eser, 
Kritische Würdigung der Modellentwürfe eines Regelungsmechanismus zur Vermeidung von 
Jurisdiktionskonflikten in Conflicts of jurisdiction in cross-border crime situations, ed. Sinn 
(Universitätsverlag Osnabrück 2012), pp. 566 ff. However, the states concerned can easily solve 
this problem, for instance by limiting their jurisdiction or allowing for an extradition. The 
suspect, by contrast, does not have such possibilities. However, a regulation that defines which 
Member State is competent to try the case (see infra 3.4) would also solve this problem.
22 Lagodny 2001, p. 67; Panzavolta, Choice of Forum and the Lawful Judge Concept in Choice of 
Forum in Cooperation against EU Financial Crime, ed. Luchtman (Eleven International 2013), 
p. 162; Luchtman, Choice of Forum and the Prosecution of Cross-Border Crime in the European 
Union – What Role for the Legality Principle? in Choice of Forum in Cooperation against EU 
Financial Crime, ed. Luchtman (Eleven International 2013), p. 11. 
23 Compare Ligeti/Weyembergh, The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: Certain Constitutional 
Issues in The European Public Prosecutor’s Office, ed. Erkelens, Meij & Pawlik (Springer 2014), 
p. 68.
24 All Member States willing to prosecute will also be interested in speedy and uncomplicated 
cooperation with other Member States whose assistance is needed.
25 In this sense see Thomas, Das Recht auf Einmaligkeit der Strafverfolgung. Vom nationalen zum 
internationalen ne bis in idem (Nomos 2002), pp. 128 ff. and 322 ff.; Klip, European Criminal 
Law, 2nd edition (Intersentia 2012), p. 475. Of a different opinion Eckstein, Grund und Grenzen 
transnationalen Schutzes vor mehrfacher Strafverfolgung in Europa, in 124 Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (2012), pp. 498 ff.
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the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, cf. Article 
82(1) TFEU. But can a Member State really be sure that its interest in prosecution will 
duly be taken into account when the case is adjudicated in another Member State? 
It is submitted26 that two aspects can call this into doubt: firstly, the act may be criminal-
ised in the other Member State, but on the basis of entirely different considerations. If, 
for instance, Member State X wants to prosecute A for an offence of espionage, it could 
hardly be expected to refrain from prosecution when the act is merely classified as un-
lawful entry in Member State B. In such cases a common basis for the assessment of the 
wrongfulness of the act is missing. As a consequence, a conviction in Member State B 
would send out a completely different message than one in Member State A. However, 
not every minor deviation between the criminal laws of different Member States can jus-
tify each of them having a legitimate interest to conduct its own proceeding. In particular, 
the level of sanctions cannot be but one aspect indicating the lack of a common value 
basis. Rather, a conviction abroad should be regarded as sufficient as long as the ‘core of 
the reproach’ made to the offender is identical.27 This is the case e.g. where differences 
in a theft case exist only with regard to aggravating circumstances, as long as the central 
element of the offence is the violation of another person’s property. In the espionage ex-
ample, by contrast, such a common basis would be missing. The second aspect that could 
motivate a Member State to initiate its own proceedings and not entrust prosecution to 
another Member State is the concern that the latter might not conduct the proceedings 
in an adequate way. That assumption could be based, for instance, on a lack of personnel 
or technical resources, or on a manifest unwillingness to prosecute.28
This being said, it is only a small step to concede that a Member State can have a legiti-
mate interest in prosecution even after a final decision has been handed down in another 
Member State. However, at that stage it needs to be taken into account that a final deci-
sion normally creates a certain confidence on the part of the defendant that no further 
proceedings will be initiated. Thus, a possible interest in prosecuting the act a second 
time has to be weighed against the defendant’s interest in legal certainty (see infra. 3.4.4). 
2.2 Interests affected by ‘abstract’ conflicts of criminal jurisdiction
The following remarks regard so-called ‘abstract’ conflicts of criminal jurisdiction, i.e. 
situations where an act is linked to several Member States, of which only one can pros-
26 In detail, see Zimmermann 2014, pp. 195-200.
27 Compare also Böse, Der Grundsatz ‘ne bis in idem’ in der Europäischen Union, in Goltdammer’s 
Archiv für Strafrecht (2003), pp. 760 ff.; Thomas 2002, pp. 168 and 225; sceptical Eser & Burchard 
2006, p. 511.
28 Vogel, Internationales und europäisches ne bis in idem, in Festschrift für Friedrich-Christian 
Schroeder zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Hoyer et al. (Müller 2006), p. 882.
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ecute (for instance because the others have not implemented a particular jurisdictional 
principle or because they have not criminalised the respective act). A second case may 
demonstrate that even more elementary questions can arise in that scenario.
Case 2:
This time, A and T are both German nationals. At a conference in Munich, A provides T 
with a lethal dose of barbiturates because T wants to take his own life and has asked A to 
help him. T immediately takes almost all the pills along with a glass of beer. However, the 
dose is too small and does not affect T immediately. T is disappointed and enters a train 
to Austria, where he wants to recreate and rethink his decision. Soon after his arrival in 
Vienna, the drugs suddenly take effect and T dies.
Here, the starting point is quite similar: the case is linked to Germany and Austria. But it 
differs from the original case in one very important aspect: this type of ‘assisted suicide’ is 
not punishable in Germany,29 whereas the Austrian penal code does contain a provision 
criminalising such behaviour.30 Of course it might be objected that this is not a conflict 
of jurisdiction in a strict sense because only Austria can be interested in prosecuting A. 
However, it is submitted that also here such a conflict exists, as two legal regimes can 
claim to be applicable. Thus, it is not the jurisdiction to adjudicate which is of interest, 
but the jurisdiction to prescribe. Nevertheless, this situation should likewise be discussed 
under the headline of conflicts of jurisdiction because the problems that arise are quite 
similar: once again, the interest of the Member State that is in the position to prosecute 
(i.e. Austria) is to deter from, prevent, and retaliate for a behaviour that is a criminal of-
fence in its domestic legal order. The interests of the perpetrator A can be deemed even 
more fundamental than in our original case: from her perspective, the problem is that she 
committed an act in a place where that act was not illegal, and at that moment nothing 
was indicating that Austria might have jurisdiction. Unlike in the first case, she could 
therefore hardly foresee that she would be criminally liable at all.
Finally, it becomes obvious that a conflict exists in this case when we take into consider-
ation that also interests of the German state are involved. Germany could claim that an 
act which is committed on German soil should not be subjected to Austrian law. This 
is because the German legislator might have had good reasons not to criminalise the 
actual conduct, for instance when this decision has been based on constitutional consid-
erations. As a consequence, Germany can claim that this decision against criminalisation 
be respected by other Member States.31 Furthermore, a positive obligation to ensure fun-
damental rights of German citizens might be derived from German (constitutional) law. 
29 Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil Band II (C.H. Beck 2003), § 26 margin no. 3.
30 Section 77 of the Austrian Penal Code also covers assistance provided to someone killing himself.
31 It can even be argued that this can be derived from international law, see Ambos 2011, margin 
no. 11.
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In other words, Germany might have an interest to protect its citizen A from criminal 
prosecution that she could not foresee.
2.3 Legal foundation of these interests
So far, it can be concluded that conflicts of jurisdiction appear in two forms: as con-
crete conflicts (overlapping jurisdiction to adjudicate) and abstract conflicts (overlapping 
jurisdiction to prescribe). As seen above, both types are problematic for the persons and 
states involved. This alone would already justify the demand that a mechanism to prevent 
and solve such conflicts be established. However, this claim would be even more compel-
ling if the interests described above were also legally guaranteed. The legislative bodies in 
the EU might then even be positively obliged to take measures in order to protect these 
interests. 
In national (often constitutional) law, the individual’s interest in being able to foresee 
criminal liability as well as the sanction that can be imposed is protected by the already 
mentioned principle of legality, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Similarly, it can be 
argued that a lack of clarity regarding the applicable rules of procedure as well as the 
possibility of forum shopping by prosecutors to the suspect’s detriment would—in an 
inner-state context—collide with the right to be sentenced in a fair trial and by a tribunal 
established by law, cf. Article 6(1) ECHR.32 These two guarantees therefore put an obliga-
tion on national legislators to establish clear rules in the fields of substantive criminal law 
and criminal procedure.33 Finally, the problems arising from parallel proceedings make 
an effective defence more complicated (if not impossible) and thus conflict with essential 
rights of the defendant. However, in the two cases that we have just discussed, there was 
no shortcoming in the applicable national laws—the national legislators had not made 
any mistake.34 The problems regarding the foreseeability of criminal liability and of the 
applicable procedural law rather stem from the transnational dimension of the two cases. 
The same is true for the right to an effective defence. This allows for the conclusion that 
legitimate interests of suspects—although well-recognised in a purely domestic criminal 
32 Compare Coëme et al. v. Belgium, ECtHR judgement of 22.06.2000, appl. no. 32492/96, 
paras. 98 ff., particularly para. 101; Lavents v. Latvia, ECtHR Judgement of 22.11.2002, appl. no. 
58442/00, para. 114; Savino et al. v. Italy, ECtHR judgement of 28.04.2009, appl. no. 17214/05, 
para. 94; Panzavolta 2013, pp. 149 ff.; Zimmermann 2014, pp. 236-238.
33 Zimmermann, Third Demand: Respect for the Principle of Legality and Judicial Principles 
in European Criminal Proceedings in A Manifesto on European Criminal Procedure Law, ed. 
European Criminal Policy Initiative (Skrifter utgivna av Juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms 
universitet 2014), pp. 232 ff.; Zimmermann 2015, pp. 161-165.
34 Jeßberger, Der transnationale Geltungsbereich des deutschen Strafrechts (Mohr Siebeck 2011), 
p. 143; Pohl, Vorbehalt und Anerkennung: Der europäische Haftbefehl zwischen Grundgesetz und 
europäischem Primärrecht (Nomos 2009), p. 160; Lagodny 2001, p. 115; Zimmermann 2014, pp. 
149-153.
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proceeding—are not effectively protected in cross-border cases.35 Since national legisla-
tors traditionally tend to focus on their internal affairs, precise rules on the rights of in-
dividuals in transnational situations are rare. To use a common metaphore, one could say 
that the suspect is left ‘sitting between two chairs’ because the case is linked to (at least) 
two jurisdictions, but none of them fully ensures judicial guarantees in that particular 
scenario. This phenomenon can be described as ‘cross-border gap’. 
However, the fact that the interests of individuals who are affected by conflicts of criminal 
jurisdiction are recognised in national law—and even in national constitutional law—
allows for the conclusion that they ought to be protected. And which other institution 
could be the addressee of this demand than the legislator of the European Union? If the 
Union is to become ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ as Article 1 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) proclaims, and a single area of justice, as it is stipulat-
ed in Article 67 TFEU, that means no less than that the Union is gradually developing 
structures which equal those of a state. But then it should also provide legal structures in 
the field of criminal justice that can keep up with those of a state.36 Therefore it should 
be considered the task of the Union to close the ‘cross-border gap’ in the protection of 
essential criminal law and procedure guarantees, such as nullum crimen sine lege and 
the right to be judged by a court established by law in a fair trial. This view is supported 
by Article 82(1)(b) TFEU, which states that ‘the European Parliament and the Europe-
an Council […] shall adopt measures to […] prevent and settle conflicts of jurisdiction 
between the Member States’ (emphasis added).37 As far as the interests of the person 
who shall be prosecuted are concerned,38 Article 51(1)(2) of the Charter on Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (CFR) provides an additional legal basis for an obligation on the part 
of the Union to put in place a more convincing solution.39 According to that provision, 
the Union—as well as the Member States when implementing EU law—’shall therefore 
35 Zimmermann 2014, pp. 184-185, 188-194 and 214.
36 Zimmermann 2014, pp. 221-222; in a similar vein Luchtman 2013, pp. 17 ff.; Böse & 
Meyer, Die Beschränkung nationaler Strafgewalten als Möglichkeit zur Vermeidung 
von Jurisdiktionskonflikten in der Europäischen Union, in Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik 2011, p. 341.
37 Caeiro, Commentary on the ‘European Touch’ of the Comparative Appraisal, in Substantive 
Criminal Law of the European Union, ed. Klip (Maklu 2011), pp. 124 and 130.
38 By contrast, an obligation is difficult to establish with regard to the Member States’ interest 
in prosecution. Indeed, the obligation to respect the Member States’ ‘essential state functions’ 
pursuant to Article 4(2)(2) TEU could serve as a legal basis. However, the only conclusion that 
can be derived from this vague notion is that any EU measure to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction 
must be flexible enough to take into account a Member State’s special interest in prosecution in 
a particular case. For details see Zimmermann 2014, pp. 244-246.
39 Zimmermann 2014, pp. 219-221; Borowsky, Article 51 in Charta der Grundrechte der 
Europäischen Union, ed. Meyer (4th edition, Nomos 2014), margin no. 31; in a similar vein 
-without reference to Article 51(1)(2) CFR- Luchtman 2013, p. 47.
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respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof’ (emphasis 
added). Especially the last subclause is of relevance in the present context. It is submitted 
that clear European rules on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction would indeed ‘promote 
the application’ of the principle of legality (Article 49(1) CFR) as well as the right to a fair 
trial and a tribunal established by law (Articles 47(2) and 48(2) CFR) because they would 
help to ensure judicial guarantees in transnational cases. 
2.4 Existing EU legislation
What has the Union done so far in order to comply with this mandate? The first as-
pect that deserves being mentioned in this regard is the transnational ne bis in idem rule 
which was established as early as 1990 in Articles 54 and 55 of the Convention Imple-
menting the Schengen Agreement (CISA). On an international level, it must be regarded 
as an immense innovation, as before that, the right not to be prosecuted and punished 
twice was only recognised within one and the same jurisdiction.40 Meanwhile, this trans-
national guarantee has been confirmed—some even say extended41—in Article 50 CFR. 
In our first case, these ne bis in idem rules help to avoid repeated proceedings in the four 
Member States involved: as soon as one of them has given a final judgement, proceedings 
in all other Member States are blocked. The answer to our first question, whether each of 
the four Member States can prosecute A, is therefore clearly negative. What, however, of 
our second question, that is, which Member State should prosecute the case? The ne bis in 
idem rules establish a pure priority regime, which is often called a principle of ‘first come, 
first served’42 (and one might incidentally add ‘the only one to be served’).43 Of course 
this principle entails an immense improvement for the suspect, but only with a view to 
40 Satzger 2012, § 8 margin nos. 64-68 (with further references).
41 Unlike Article 54 CISA, Article 50 CFR does not make the ne bis in idem guarantee dependent 
upon an enforcement element, and also the exceptions laid down in Article 55 CISA are not 
explicitly mentioned. Some authors therefore want to abandon these restrictions, see for instance 
Swoboda, Paying the Debts – Late Nazi Trials before German Courts: The Case of Heinrich 
Boere, in 9 JICJ (2011), pp. 265 ff.; Böse, Die transnationale Geltung des Grundsatzes ‘ne bis 
in idem’ und das ‘Vollstreckungselement’. Zugleich Besprechung von BGH, Beschluss vom 
25.10.2010, in Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht 2011, pp. 506 ff.; Vogel 2006, p. 890. However, 
it appears more convincing to interpret Articles 54 and 55 CISA as secondary law ‘limitations’ 
to the primary law guarantee of Article 50 CFR within the meaning of Article 52(1) CFR, see 
CJEU, C-129/14 PPU Spasic paras. 54 ff.; see also Satzger 2012, § 8 margin no. 68; Burchard & 
Brodowski, Art. 50 Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union und das europäische ne bis 
in idem nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, in StraFo 2010, pp. 179 ff. 
42 See COM (2005) 696 final, pp. 3 and 8.
43 Caeiro, Jurisdiction in criminal matters in the EU: negative and positive conflicts and 
beyond, in KritV 2010, p. 377; Burchard, ‘Wer zuerst kommt, mahlt zuerst – und als einziger!’ 
– Zuständigkeitskonzentrationen durch das europäische ne bis in idem bei beschränkt 
rechtskräftigen Entscheidungen, in Onlinezeitschrift für Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum 
Strafrecht 2015, pp. 26 ff.
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repeated proceedings. The other problems caused by conflicts of jurisdiction can in no 
way be solved by ne bis in idem rules:44 these rules only come into play once a final deci-
sion has been rendered, they do not provide effective protection against parallel proceed-
ings. Furthermore, it remains a matter of coincidence which Member State is the first to 
reach a final decision. But should aspects like the sickness of a judge or a delay occuring 
in the delivery of mail really determine which Member State has the final say? It must be 
recalled that such factors then ultimately determine the substantive and procedural rules 
according to which the case will be adjudicated. That does not offer any foreseeability for 
the suspect, nor can a Member State with a particularly strong and legitimate interest in 
prosecution be sure that the case will be dealt with in an adequate way. And, even more 
seriously, this priority regime does not rule out manipulations: two Member States that 
simultaneously prosecute the same case could informally agree that one of them shall de-
lay its own proceedings in order to make sure that the other one will be the first to come 
to a final decision.
Therefore, additional rules are needed. But the only ones that can be found are those of 
a Framework Decision of 2009 which shall serve the ‘prevention and settlement of con-
flicts of jurisdiction’.45 However, this is a rather clear case of false labelling: according to 
Article 10(1) of this Framework Decision, ‘when it is established that parallel proceedings 
exist, the competent authorities of the Member States concerned shall enter into direct 
consultations in order to reach consensus on any effective solution aimed at avoiding the 
adverse consequences arising from such parallel proceedings, which may, where appro-
priate, lead to the concentration of the criminal proceedings in one Member State.’ And 
Article 11 continues: ‘When the competent authorities of Member States enter into direct 
consultations on a case […], they shall consider the facts and merits of the case and all the 
factors which they consider to be relevant.’ In other words, the Member States concerned 
shall consider the possibility to concentrate the proceedings in one of them. But these 
provisions neither establish an obligation to concentrate the proceedings—that remains 
no more than an option—nor do they clarify which criteria may or may not be taken into 
account. That is why these unregulated consultations have, somewhat provocatively, been 
called an ‘invitation to forum-shop’.46 
3  Possible Solutions
This is where our analysis of the status quo ends. In the remaining discussions below, 
different approaches for a more satisfactory solution to conflicts of criminal jurisdiction 
44 Zimmermann 2014, pp. 280-285 with further references.
45 O.J. 2009, L 328/42.
46 European Criminal Policy Initiative, A Manifesto on European Criminal Procedure Law, in 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2013), p. 441.
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in the European Union will be assessed. A regulatory model will ultimately be proposed 
which could avoid the shortcomings identified above.
3.1 Application of foreign criminal law
A first option could be the application of foreign criminal law,47 a model which is quite 
common in international private law.48 If one accepts that a criminal court does not nec-
essarily have to apply only its domestic criminal law, the question of where to prosecute a 
case and the one of which law to apply could be separated. As a consequence, it would ap-
pear less problematic to choose the forum state on the basis of efficiency considerations, 
as long as the applicable criminal law is determined by substantive and foreseeable crite-
ria. And indeed such an application of foreign law is not at all something entirely unusual 
for most criminal justice systems49—for instance, every double criminality test implies to 
a certain extent the application of foreign criminal law.50 
However, there are several shortcomings of this approach that should not be underes-
timated. Firstly, it would be very difficult for judges to apply foreign law correctly. Of 
course this is a general problem that also judges in civil proceedings have to face. But if 
we take into account that in criminal law uncertainties about the correct meaning of a 
legal provision are even less acceptable than in other fields of law (as a consequence of 
the lex certa requirement), the argument remains. A second point is that there are vari-
ous connections between procedural and substantive law—codes of criminal procedure 
constantly refer to categories defined by substantive criminal law. For instance, a code 
of criminal procedure may declare certain investigative measures admissible only for a 
list of specific offences, or it may restrict the competence of specific courts to a certain 
number of crimes, or it may grant a legal position—such as the right to have access to 
the case file—only where a particularly serious offence is being investigated. If a court 
would have to apply foreign criminal law, then all these references of criminal procedure 
to substantive law would have to be interpreted in the light of the foreign legal order. But 
what if that foreign criminal justice system uses a completely different vocabulary? If in 
our second case, for instance, A was arrested in Sweden, Swedish authorities might have 
to ask themselves whether the offence of ‘assisted suicide’ in Austrian law is one for whose 
investigation Swedish criminal procedure law permits a house search or a telephone tap-
ping. Ultimately that means it would have to be decided on a case by case basis which 
47 In this sense Eser & Burchard 2006, pp. 521 ff.; Böse, Choice of Forum and Jurisdiction in Choice 
of Forum in Cooperation Against EU Financial Crime, ed. Luchtman (Eleven International 2013), 
pp. 86 ff.; open for this idea also Eisele 2013, p. 29.
48 See, for instance, Regulation 864/2007, O.J. 2007 L 199/40.
49 Satzger 2012, § 3 margin nos. 4-5; see also Helenius, The If, How and When of Criminal 
Jurisdiction - What is Criminal Jurisdiction Anyway?, in this issue, pp. 41 f.
50 Satzger 2012, § 4 margin no. 41; Helenius 2015, pp. 41 f.
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procedural rules apply. Taking into account that these rules often allow for interferences 
with fundamental rights (as is the case when investigative measures are ordered) and 
determine the procedural position of the suspect, this would hardly be acceptable from a 
rule of law perspective. The third and final reason why an application of foreign law does 
not appear an optimal solution is that every conviction by a criminal court is intended 
to have a particular stigmatising effect on the convicted person because it expresses the 
values of the society. But could a court which applies foreign law really express the values 
of the foreign society—even though it might not always share them? 
3.2 The ‘consultation model’
A second option is what could be called the ‘consultation model’.51 It aims at the solu-
tion of conflicts of jurisdiction on a case by case basis, by means of a consensual decision 
by all Member States concerned. Thus, the particularities of every individual case can 
be taken into account and there is no need to give priority to a certain criterion. This is 
certainly the model that is the closest to the Union’s current approach, which has been 
briefly described above. But that also means that the shortcomings are the same: since 
the decision on the applicable law could only be taken after the act has already been 
committed, this solution would cause problems for the foreseeability of criminal pun-
ishment. Furthermore, there is always a reasonable concern that forum shopping might 
occur when prosecution authorities of different Member States are allowed to determine 
the state of trial by means of consultations. As seen above, a criminal justice system based 
on the rule of law cannot tolerate this risk—irrespective of whether the choice of the fo-
rum actually is manipulated.
3.3 The ‘hierarchy model’
A third option could be an allocation of criminal jurisdiction by means of an EU 
regulation, i.e. not on a case-by-case basis, but pursuant to abstract rules for all possible 
cases. The most common concept within this group of proposals is to establish a hierar-
chy between the different principles of criminal jurisdiction and give priority to one prin-
51 Article 26(2) of the Corpus Juris 2000 in The Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member 
States Volume 1, ed. Delmas-Marty and Vervaele (Intersentia 2000), pp. 206 ff.; the volume 
Conflicts of jurisdiction in cross-border crime situations, ed. Sinn (Universitätsverlag Osnabrück 
2012), pp. 601 ff.; Herrnfeld, Mechanisms for Settling Conflicts of Jurisdiction, in Choice of 
Forum in Cooperation Against EU Financial Crime, ed. Luchtman (Eleven International 2013), 
pp. 206 ff.; Lagodny 2001, p. 108; Vander Beken et al. 2002, p. 51; Biehler et al., Freiburg Proposal 
on Concurrent Jurisdictions and the Prohibition of Multiple Prosecutions in the European Union 
(Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht 2003), pp.14 ff.
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ciple.52 Admittedly, this goes beyond the acquis of public international law.53 The main 
objection against this solution is that the best place for prosecution depends on so many 
factors that it is impossible to create an abstract provision which duly respects them all.54 
And: Even if such a hierarchy was established, still a solution would have to be found 
for situations in which several states have an equally strong link to the case, for instance 
when two states claim jurisdiction on the ground of the territoriality principle.55
3.4 The author’s suggestion: a solution combining hierarchy and consultation 
elements56
What is the way out of this dilemma? A future EU instrument should aim at com-
bining the strengths and avoiding the shortcomings of the different models. Therefore, 
it is submitted that on an overarching level, the solution should indeed be build upon an 
abstract hierarchy of jurisdiction criteria. As a matter of principle, only the Member State 
with the strongest link to the case (which would be determined according to this list) 
should be allowed to exercise its criminal jurisdiction. This ranking would, as the core of 
the new instrument, serve to ensure the foreseeability of the applicable law and exclude 
forum shopping. On a subsidiary level, however, it would have to be complemented by 
additional rules allowing some necessary flexibility: a ‘flexibility clause’ could enumerate 
exceptional circumstances under which a Member State with a lower-ranking link to the 
case shall have the possibility to suspend the hierarchy. In other words, this provision 
would function as a kind of ‘emergency brake’. Only when the hierarchy does not lead to 
a clear result or when a Member State pulls the ‘emergency brake’, should there be room 
52 See the Draft Council of Europe Convention, Recommendation 420 (1965), Assembly debate 
on 29th January 1965 (24th Sitting); Ambos 2011, margin nos. 56 ff.; in a similar vein Fuchs, 
Regulation of Jurisdiction and Substantive Criminal Law, in A Programme for European Criminal 
Justice, ed. Schünemann (Carl Heymanns 2006), pp. 364 ff.
53 Ambos 2011, margin nos. 56 et seqq.
54 Lagodny 2001, pp. 48 ff.; Herrnfeld 2013, p. 193; Caeiro 2011, p. 133; Eckstein 2012, p. 504; 
Schünemann, The Foundations of Trans-national Criminal Proceedings, in A Programme for 
European Criminal Justice, ed. Schünemann (Carl Heymanns 2006), p. 357.
55 See, for instance, Herrnfeld 2013, p. 193; Caeiro 2011, p. 133; Hecker, Die rechtlichen 
Möglichkeiten der Europäischen Union zur Lösung von Kompetenzkonflikten, in Conflicts 
of jurisdiction in cross-border crime situations, ed. Sinn (Universitätsverlag Osnabrück 2012), 
p. 98; Eser 2012, p. 569. However, this argument can be refuted as the establishment of such a 
hierarchy would still mean a significant improvement, see Zimmermann 2014, p. 348.
56 For details, including an extensive proposal for such a regulation, see Zimmermann 2014, 
pp. 369-454. Other ‘mixed models’ can be found in Böse, Meyer & Schneider, Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters in the European Union Volume 2 (Nomos 2014), pp. 381 ff.; 
the volume Conflicts of jurisdiction in cross-border crime situations, ed. Sinn (Universitätsverlag 
Osnabrück 2012), pp. 606 ff.; as well as the volume A Programme for European Criminal Justice, 
ed. Schünemann (Carl Heymanns 2006), pp. 258 ff.
16
Frank Zimmermann
for consultations between Member States. However, detailed rules would have to regulate 
these consultations.
But before the contents of the proposed instrument can be explained in further detail, 
some technical questions need to be answered. The first is whether the Union has the 
competence to adopt such measures at all. Article 82(1)(2)(b) TFEU, which calls for mea-
sures to prevent and settle conflicts of jurisdiction, clearly gives a positive answer.57 Sec-
ondly, a decision on the legislative form of the instrument must be made. Article 82(1) 
TFEU confers upon the Union the competence to adopt not only directives, but also 
regulations.58 It is submitted that a regulation would be preferable in the present context 
because a directive would have to be implemented by Member States. For such a delicate 
topic, however, a directive would most likely encounter resistance, which would entail a 
considerable risk of incorrect implementation.59
3.4.1 Level 1: Hierarchy of jurisdiction criteria
In order to establish a hierarchy, it must first be decided which jurisdictional criteria 
shall be given priority. To that aim, it needs to be examined to what extent these respect 
the above-mentioned interests of the individual and of the Member States involved. As a 
general rule it should be accepted that the easier a criterion makes it to allocate a case to 
one single Member State, the more weight it should be given. With this in mind, a hier-
archy can be outlined as follows:
• The strongest link would have to be the place where the act was performed: since ev-
erybody must expect to be treated according to the laws of the place where he acted, 
this criterion can ensure the foreseeability of criminal punishment better than others. 
Furthermore, the need to stigmatise the act as unlawful is particularly strong in the 
place where it was committed.60 
• This last argument basically also applies with regard to the place where the effects 
of the act occur. However, our second case illustrates quite well that this is an aspect 
which can depend upon coincidence. At least theoretically, it can even allow for ma-
nipulations, for instance if T—the fatally poisoned victim—is brought to a different 
Member State and dies there. Thus, the place where the act causes a result should only 
be the second-strongest criterion in the hierarchy. 
57 For a more thorough analysis see Böse, Meyer & Schneider 2014, pp. 367 ff.
58 Satzger 2012, § 8 margin no. 46.
59 For the adoption of a directive Herrnfeld 2013, pp. 200 and 202.
60 Zimmermann 2015, p. 170. According to Böse, Meyer & Schneider 2014, p. 390, the causation of 
an effect should only establish criminal liability in the Member State where the perpetrator acted 
if the causation of said effect was also criminalised in the Member State where it occurred.
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• Only in cases where neither the act is committed nor an effect produced on one 
Member State’s territory, should the nationality (or the place of residence) of the of-
fender be decisive:61 although this criterion will normally make sure that the case is 
adjudicated according to substantive criminal provisions which are well known to 
the perpetrator, it is less convincing than those based on the principle of territoriality. 
This is mainly because the suspect is often unknown at an early stage of the proceed-
ings (not to mention the presumption of innocence). 
• The nationality (or place of residence) of the victim should only come into play in 
the fourth place.62 The reason is that many offences do not affect an individual; and if 
they do, the perpetrator will not necessarily know where the victim is from. 
• The flag principle, which has traditionally served as a mere substitute for stronger 
links,63 should be put in the fifth place of the ranking, so that it does not come into 
play if the vessel is in the territorial waters of a Member State when the offence is 
committed or if the principles of active and passive personality apply. It should be 
followed by all further jurisdiction criteria recognised by international public law. 
If two Member States can base their interest in prosecution on an equally strong link, the 
one which additionally has the next strongest link should be competent to adjudicate the 
case—a method which can be called ‘accumulation principle.’ 64 If, for instance, a German 
national drinks a bottle of wine in Munich and then drives across the border to Austria, 
the act of drunk-driving is committed in Germany and Austria.65 But since the offender 
is German, only Germany would be allowed to exercise its jurisdiction.
Some readers might have noticed that the principle of state protection does not appear 
in the list of criteria. This is because it largely depends on each state’s sensitivity which 
crimes are regarded as so severe attacks against the society that they shall fall under that 
61  Similarly Böse, Meyer & Schneider 2014, pp. 398 ff.
62 According to Böse, Meyer & Schneider 2014, pp. 401 ff., this principle should be abandoned 
completely..
63 Zimmermann 2014, p. 377; Kato & Sagawa, Japan in Conflicts of jurisdiction in cross-border 
crime situations, ed. Sinn (Universitätsverlag Osnabrück 2012), pp. 335.
64 This part of the proposal was inspired by Lelieur-Fischer, Comments on the Green Paper on 
Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the principle ne bis in idem in criminal proceedings (Max-Planck-
Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht 2006), pp. 12-13; Ambos 2011, margin 
no. 63.
65 Very complicated questions arise when the assessment of the act differs considerably, for instance 
when the blood alcohol concentration exceeds the tolerated level on one side of the border, but 
not on the other. In such cases, the CJEU case-law on the identity of acts in the sense of Article 
54 CISA (see C-436/04 ‘van Esbroeck’ ECR 2006, I-2333) does not offer a satisfactory solution. 
Rather, it should be considered to make an exception and regard the events on the two sides of 
the border as different acts, see Zimmermann 2014, pp. 416 ff. 
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state’s jurisdiction even when committed abroad and by foreigners.66 For reasons of fore-
seeability, such normative aspects should not be considered on the first level, i.e. in the 
overarching hierarchy. Likewise, it should not be relevant at this stage how strong the 
country’s link to the case as established by the enumerated criteria is in reality (e.g. if 
an act committed on one Member State’s territory was still one of preparatory nature or 
already constituted the main act of the offence). Finally, procedural aspects like the loca-
tion of evidence or the place where the suspect is arrested have been left out because they 
depend upon coincidence. 
3.4.2 Level 2: Flexibility clause 
On the second level, a flexibility clause needs to be drafted. Here, several normative 
aspects can be taken into account. But since this ‘emergency brake’ must not lose its ex-
ceptional character, these aspects should be enumerated in an exhaustive list. It should 
be a general prerequisite for all categories that a decision in the Member State with the 
strongest link would not sufficiently take into account these special circumstances. This 
is conceivable if that state is unable or unwilling to prosecute67 or if its assessment of the 
legal wrong deviates completely from that in the Member State with the weaker link.
This catalogue should be limited to 
• essential interests of state security, 
• offences that are committed by public agents of a Member State, 
• serious tax offences, 
• cases in which victim and offender have the same nationality and 
• cases where a state with a weaker link would violate its international obligations if it 
left the prosecution to another Member State.68 
Finally, one more flexible criterion could be included, namely that the prosecution 
proves indispensable for the state with the weaker link in order to defend its funda-
mental values. Of course that last criterion bears a certain risk of abuse. Therefore, it 
should be an additional requirement that according to the law of the Member State 
with the weaker link a prison sentence is to be expected which—due to its length—
will actually be enforced and cannot be suspended.69 
66 Zimmermann 2014, pp. 270 ff.
67 This formula stems from Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
This idea already shines up in Biehler et al. 2003, pp. 32-33.
68 Even more restrictive Böse, Meyer & Schneider 2014, pp. 392 ff.
69 The notion ‘suspended sentence’ is taken from Art. 2 no. 2 of Framework Decision 2008/947/
JHA, O.J. 2008 L 337/102.
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3.4.3 Level 3: Strictly regulated consultations as a measure of last resort
In a third stage, consultation proceedings should be initiated if a Member State pulls 
the ‘emergency brake’ or if it proves impossible to define one competent state on the basis 
of the hierarchy. However, these consultations would have to differ considerably from 
those provided in the Framework Decision on the prevention of conflicts of jurisdiction: 
• As we have seen, it is one of the most essential interests of the defendant to avoid 
parallel proceedings. It should therefore be compulsory to concentrate proceedings 
in one Member State. If the Member States involved do not come to a consensual 
solution, this should therefore be decided by an independent and impartial author-
ity.70 This could be a task for Eurojust,71 at once when the institutional foundations 
have been laid.72 
• In order to exclude forum shopping, there should be an exhaustive list of criteria 
that may be considered when the decision on the forum state is made. In this third 
stage, these could be both normative and pragmatic criteria, such as how strong the 
interests of the Member States involved actually are, where a proceeding would be 
most efficient, whether an effective defence will be possible and how easily victims 
can participate.
• It needs to be ensured that the consultations are fully transparent. This requires a 
very thorough documentation of all reasons for the decision on the forum state. Fur-
thermore, the consultations should be supervised by the neutral authority (possibly 
Eurojust). Also the suspect (or his counsel) should have the right to be heard and be 
present at the consultations, at least unless this would put the investigations at risk.
• Finally, the decision on the forum state must be subject to full judicial control. The 
representatives of the Member States must therefore not enjoy any discretion.
70 Lagodny 2001, pp. 126 ff., suggests the establishment of a special court for these decisions. 
71 Article 2(4), A Programme for European Criminal Justice, ed. Schünemann (Carl Heymanns 
2006), pp. 259 and 261; Suominen, The Past, Present and Future of Eurojust, 9 MJECL (2008), 
p. 233; Massa, Jurisdiction in England and Wales and in the Netherlands: a comparative appraisal 
with a European touch, in Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union, ed. Klip (Maklu 
2011), p. 120; Eisele 2013, pp. 11 and 23-24.
72 Some authors argue that the structure of Eurojust is better apt for a consensual settlement of 
conflicts of jurisdiction, see Lagodny 2001, p. 126; Herrnfeld 2013, p. 201. However, this does 
not rule out that it could be given a more dominant role de lege ferenda.
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3.4.4 Some collateral provisions
If an EU regulation which respects these guidelines is adopted, at least the big ma-
jority of cases could be dealt with in an appropriate way. However, several additional 
rules would have to be established for more complicated cases, particularly such involv-
ing more than one person. Since this is not the place to describe these in detail, some 
brief remarks will have to suffice: it should be distinguished between acts by different 
persons with a material connection73 and those with a rather loose connection. In view 
of the first ones, criminal jurisdiction should, in a single area of justice, be exercised by 
only one Member State in order to ensure that they are treated consistently. This should 
be the Member State which has the strongest connection to the totality of the acts. With 
regard to the latter -for instance different offences committed in the framework of one 
criminal organisation- concentration of proceedings is of course desirable. The same 
applies for different acts committed by one person. Thus, inter-state consultations for 
this purpose do make sense. But Member States should not be obliged to concentrate 
proceedings simply due to a loose connection between the acts. It follows that also a sub-
sidiary decision by Eurojust would not be necessary in those situations. 
One74 of the more technical aspects which should be considered is that abuses of the new 
jurisdiction regime must be prevented. Therefore, the Member State which is competent 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction according to the new regulation should -if the act is 
punishable according to its law- be expressly obliged to duly investigate and prosecute 
the case, at least if another Member State has signalised its interest in prosecution. In par-
ticular it should not be allowed to dispense with prosecution after such notification with-
out the other Member State’s consent. Finally, the circumstances must be defined which, 
by way of exception, allow for a reopening of the proceedings after a final decision was 
handed down in one Member State.75 One case where this should be considered is when 
the Member State competent to exercise jurisdiction failed to comply with its obligation 
to duly carry out the investigation or prosecution.76
73 Such a material connection exists when the acts of different persons shall serve the implementation 
of a common plan or when the act of one person is knowingly induced or supported by the act 
of another person; see Zimmermann 2014, pp. 422 ff. 
74 Further provisions would have to oblige Member States to communicate as soon as they become 
aware that a case has cross-border elements. Furthermore, the point in time from which on 
the hierarchy becomes binding needs to be determined, as well as possibilities to change the 
Member State of trial if new evidence is discovered later. For this last aspect see Article 2(5), A 
Programme for European Criminal Justice, ed. Schünemann (Carl Heymanns 2006), p. 259; for 
details on the necessary corollary provisions see Zimmermann 2014, pp. 434-443.
75 This would not violate Article 50 CFR; see Article 52(1) CFR.
76 The respective provision could be inspired by Articles 17 and 20 of the Rome Statute; see once 
again Biehler et al. 2003, pp. 32-33.
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Since one of the chief objectives of this proposal is to ensure the foreseeability of the 
applicable law, a final suggestion would be to include a general proviso for cases where 
none of the detailed rules outlined above offers a sufficient solution. Such a ‘transnational 
principle of legality’ could be formulated as follows: 
An act may be punished by a Member State only insofar as the citizen concerned could fore-
see the applicability of that Member State’s criminal law in the particular case, or at least 
had reason to expect a sanction which would have been comparable in terms of its type and 
severity.77 
This would ensure that nobody is punished more harshly than according to the laws 
which he could be expected to obey.
4  Concluding Remarks
Of course this contribution cannot end without proposing a solution for the two cases 
that were taken as a starting point. On the basis of the regulation proposed here, the first 
case would be easy to handle: of the Member States concerned, Germany has the stron-
gest link because the offender A acted in Munich. Therefore, only Germany could exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over the case. In the second case, the abstract hierarchy would 
lead to the result that only Germany could prosecute the case because A (and T) acted on 
German territory. However, Austria might want to prosecute the case in order to defend 
its fundamental values, and such particular interest in prosecution would be neglected 
according to the hierarchy because the act is not criminalised in Germany. But if Austria 
therefore invoked the flexibility clause and consultations were initiated, two aspects to be 
considered would certainly be the lack of foreseeability, as well as that both offender and 
victim were German nationals.78 An overall assessment of the case would thus lead to the 
conclusion that German criminal law applies. Since the conduct is not criminalised in 
Germany, A would thus ultimately not have to fear punishment.
Of course an allocation of jurisdiction as proposed here is a highly controversial issue. 
Professionals who have been working in this field will most probably, without great dif-
ficulties, be able to imagine or refer to cases where the model presented above comes to 
its limits. However, this contribution should—at least—have shown that it is possible to 
develop a solution which effectively guarantees fundamental rights of criminal law and 
procedure in cross-border cases. Moreover, such a solution could even be based on a hi-
erarchy model as long as it is reasonably complemented with flexible elements. Therefore, 
the European legislator should no longer hesitate to face this challenge.
77 Compare Zimmermann 2014, pp. 431 ff. A similar solution is offered by Böse, Meyer & Schneider 
2014, pp. 382 ff., who require intent or negligence with regard to the circumstances that make 
the prosecuting Member State’s criminal law applicable.
78 This is another category enumerated in the flexibility clause as suggested above.
